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Separation of powers in the federal government inevitably gen-
erates conflicts among the branches. In recent years the executive
branch's authority to impound funds appropriated by Congress' and
to make war without congressional approval2 has been questioned.
In earlier days debate raged over the Supreme Court's authority to
nullify legislation passed by Congress.3 A recurrent example of this
phenomenon has been the struggle between Congress and the ju-
diciary over the scope of congressional control of federal court juris-
diction. The recent controversy over school busing has highlighted
this problem. The problem is, however, neither novel nor peculiar
to the busing issue. In considering the first judiciary act Congress
debated the scope of its authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.4 In the last twenty years unpopular decisions by fed-
eral courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have led to serious dis-
cussions of curtailing federal court jurisdiction.
After Brown v. Board of Education5 there was a movement to with-
draw Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear school desegregation cases.0
During and after the McCarthy era, and perhaps in response to it,
the Supreme Court conferred upon citizens what some felt to be un-
duly broad protection from legislative investigations. 7 This prompted
t A.B. 1969, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1972, University of Pennsylvania; member of
the Pennsylvania Bar.
I. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 41 U.S.L.W. 2539 (8th Cir. Apr. 2, 1973);
Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1973); Note, Protecting the Fisc:
Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.). rev'g Holtzman v.
Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Con-
stitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 67-70 (1923).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. H.R. 1228, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), would have deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear any suit questioning state laws relating to public schools. See also
S. 3467, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (depriving the Supreme Court of appellate juris-
diction in cases attacking state public school systems "on grounds other than substan-
tial inequality of physical facilities and other tangible factors").
7. See generally Comment, Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First Amend-
ment Immunity From Committee Interrogation, 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
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a proposal to curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction to review cases in-
volving contempt of Congress, as well as cases involving state and
federal regulation of subversive activities.8 After Reynolds v. Sims9
a bill which passed the House of Representatives would have with-
drawn jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and the district courts
to hear cases in which plaintiffs sought to force reapportionment of
state legislatures.10 From 1953 to 1969 over 60 unsuccessful bills were
introduced in Congress to curtail some aspect of federal jurisdiction."
Today, because of a number of district court decisions ordering
the busing of schoolchildren to overcome segregation, 12 the issue of
congressional dominion over federal court jurisdiction is again of
vital national importance.' 3
8. See S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). It was defeated in the Senate. 104 CONG.
REc. 18687 (1958).
9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. The bill, introduced by Representative Tuck, read in part:
The Supreme Court shall not have the right to review the action of a Federal
court or a State court of last resort concerning any action taken upon a petition
or complaint seeking to apportion or reapportion any legislature of any State of
the Union or any branch thereof ....
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction to entertain any petition or com-
plaint seeking to apportion or reapportion the legislature of any State of the Union
or any branch thereof .
H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The bill was defeated in the Senate. 110 CONC.
REC. 22104 (1964).
11. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 360 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as BATOR].
The focus on relatively recent times is not meant to suggest that the phenomenon is a
new one. See C. LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1937, at 1 (1971); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 117-18 (1922) (Senator Johnson's proposal for Senate
review of cases to which a state is a party); McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportion-
ment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1964).
Another recent instance was Senator Dirksen's bill to curtail federal court activity
in obscenity cases. S. 4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill was discussed in Note,
Removal of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: A Weapon Against Obscenity?,
1969 DUKE L.J. 291.
12. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.
N.C. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See generally Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and
Congressional Power, 81 YALE L.J. 1542, 1543 n.7 (1972).
13. See, e.g., H.R. 10693, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Most proposals in response to
busing have been in the form of constitutional amendments. H.J. Res. 1035, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972); S.J. Res. 165, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.J. Res. 30, 823, 856, 858,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The busing bills backed by the Nixon administration have
attracted the most attention. H.R. 13915, 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). They are
discussed in detail in Goldberg, The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-Politics
Makes Bad Law, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 319 (1972); Thompson & Pollitt, Congressional Con-
trol of Judicial Remedies: President Nixon's Proposed Moratorium on "Busing" Orders,
50 N.C. L. REV. 809 (1972); Note, Moratorium on School Busing for the Purpose of
Achieving Racial Balance: A New Chapter in Congressional Court-Curbing, 48 NoTRr
DA ME LAWYER 208 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Moratorium on School Busing];
Note, supra note 12.
The version of the bill that passed the House forbids court-ordered busing of students
bc)oud the two schools closest to their home:
Sec. 403. (a) No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, pursuant
to section 402, order the implementation of a plan that would require the trans-
portation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest
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During the current controversy there have been two approaches
to the subject of Congress' control of federal jurisdiction. The po-
sition taken most often in contemporary debate begins with the as-
sumption that Congress has authority to abolish the lower federal
courts. 14 Since Congress has the power to abolish, this argument
runs, Congress must have plenary control over inferior federal juris-
diction.'5 Others have begun with the same assumption but feel
that a resolution of the subsequent questions is not so easily achieved.
Must Congress, they ask, to satisfy Article III, vest jurisdiction in
some federal court to hear all cases within the federal judicial power?',
What are the limits on congressional control of Supreme Court juris-
diction?' 7 If Congress can remove an entire class of cases from the
district court level, can Congress also limit the remedies available
to a court once it is given jurisdiction to hear a case?' s Virtually all
of those who have engaged in this contemporary debate, however,
assume that Congress may abolish the lower federal courts.19
That such an important assumption should be unquestioned in
the current furor over busing is surprising. Clearly it limits the
range of argument open to those favoring broad mandatory federal
jurisdiction. If the assumption is false, inquiry should be redirected
to whether Congress may selectively withdraw jurisdiction to grant
to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of
education for such student.
H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (as it passed the House and was introduced
in the Senate on August 18, 1972). Although the bill is not phrased in jurisdictional
terms, it would be a triumph of form over substance to fail to analyze it in such
terms. See Note, supra note 12, at 1546.
14. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (dictum); ]ATOR, supra
note 11, at 12; Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. Ci.
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1968); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1117
(1969); Note, Moratorium on School Busing, supra note 13, at 209-10.
15. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 158 (1960). See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187
(1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); United States v. Union
Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603 (1878); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
16. The earliest person to question the majority position appears to have been
Henry Wheaton in 1821. BATOR, supra note 11, at 314-15 n.2. It is repeated in Eisen-
stager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Although Wheaton accepted
the basic proposition he contended that Congress is compelled to grant the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to review all matters within the federal judicial power.
17. See Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L. REv. 345
(1958); Levy, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court: A Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 178 (1967); Merry, Scope of the Supreme
Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historic Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); Ratner,
supra note 15; Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence,
35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949).
18. Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 13, at 823-27; Note, supra note 12, at 1546 n.19,
1549.
19. See note 14 supra.
Vol. 83: 498, 1974
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
a particular remedy from district courts and to whether it may with-
draw a particular case or class of cases from those tribunals.20
This article will attempt to demonstrate that the premise that Con-
gress may abolish the lower federal courts is false. Such courts may
in the beginning have been a luxury for the young nation. Today
they are almost as necessary as the Supreme Court in performing
the functions given the federal judiciary in the Constitution. "The
life of a nation"' has come to depend in no small degree on these
bodies and their too hastily assumed mortality should be a matter
of general concern. If it is true, as I argue, that inferior federal
courts may not be abolished, then resolution of the corollary ques-
tions of whether Congress can selectively curtail jurisdiction or re-
sort to certain remedies is more difficult.
I. May Congress Abolish the Lower Federal Courts?
A. The Traditionat View
Article III of the Constitution is the starting point for analysis
of this question:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ...
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The foregoing text is open to several interpretations with regard to
Congress' power over lower tribunals. It states that the judicial
20. The primary focus of this article is on the power of Congress to abolish, cur-
tail the jurisdiction of, or remove remedies from, the lower federal courts. There is
a very closely related question as to the authority of Congress to restrict the juris-
diction of both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court under the jurisdictional
power and the exceptions clause of Article III. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. For a dis-
cussion of the aspects of this question that I will not address see Blumstein, The
Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dis-
missals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895 (1973).
21. A. BICKEL, THE LF-,sr DANGEROUS BRANCH 14 (1962) (writing about judicial review).
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power shall be vested in one Supreme Court "and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
The quoted phrase can be interpreted to mean that Congress may
establish lower federal courts on a discretionary basis. An equally
rational reading of Article III leads to a contrary conclusion. Section
2 gives the federal judiciary power to hear in the first instance many
cases which are not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion. 22 Thus, there is a gap between the full reach of federal ju-
dicial power and that which is conferred originally by the Consti-
tution on the Supreme Court. This gap, when read in conjunction
with the "shall" of § 1, suggests that there must be inferior courts
to exercise the residuum of federal jurisdiction withheld from the
Supreme Court. This proposition is supported as well by the fact
that § 2 originally read "the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" and
was changed to read "The judicial Power.' 23 It thus seems clear
that lower courts were intended to be covered.
An interpretation of Article III much like the second one set
forth above was advocated long ago. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee -24
Justice Story concluded from the phrase "shall be vested" that the
whole federal jurisdictional power must be vested in some federal
court. Since Article III gave federal courts jurisdiction wherever the
Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction, it followed
that congress [was] bound to create some inferior courts, in which
to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is
exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme
court cannot take original cognizance.
2 5
Justice Story later repeated this position 2  and, in a modified form,
it has found some support.
2
Justice Story's dicta might have carried the day but for the argu-
22. "In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. A constitutional challenge to a federal statute,
for instance, would be within the ambit of the federal judicial power but not within
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
23. Ratner, supra note 15, at 164. James Madison and Gouvernor Morris recom-
mended this change and it was accepted by the entire Convention without any debate.
MNI. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 425, 431 (1911) [here-
inafter cited as FARRAND].
24. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-31 (1816) (dictum).
25. Id. at 331 (emphasis in original). This theory originated not with Justice Story
but with Gouvernor Morris. 3 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 391 (App. A) (addressing
Congress).
26. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1590-94, at 409-12 (1891). A
discussion of the early debate on this topic may be found in Warren, supra note 4,
at 68-70.
27. See 1 M. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF TIlE
UNITED STATES 613-16 (1953).
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ment made popular by two distinguished scholars. Professors Hart
and Wechsler argued forcefully for the first interpretation. They
contended that the phrasing of Article III reflected a decision by
the Constitutional Convention to leave establishment of inferior
federal courts to the discretion of Congress.28 This decision seems
to have been a compromise between those who favored mandatory
inferior federal courts and those who believed that state courts could
and should perform the trial functions.2 0 Thus while Congress was
given authority to create new courts, it was not compelled to do so.3°
The Hart and Wechsler argument has for a long time preempted
serious debate on the significance of the ambiguities in Article III.
Recently, however, Professor Goebel has argued that the words "or-
dain and establish" in Article III,31 when viewed in light of their
meaning in 1787, demonstrate that the Convention intended that
lower federal courts should be created. As originally submitted to
the Committee of Style, the draft had read:
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts
as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
Legislature of the United States.
32
Goebel guesses that the change from the original submission to the
current language reflected a victory for the "four stalwart nationalists"
on the Committee.33 Goebel summarizes:
That the Committee [of Style] intended to convey the sense of
an imperative is apparent from the choice of the most forceful
words in the contemporary constitutional vocabulary-"ordain
and establish"-to direct what Congress was to do.
34
28. BATOR, supra note 11, at 11-12. The proposal for inferior tribunals was con-
tained in Randolph's Virginia Plan. I FAnRxND, supra note 23, at 21-22. It was initially
passed by the Committee of the Whole on June 4, 1787. Id. at 95. The next day, how-
ever, John Rutledge moved for and obtained reconsideration of the provision. After
reconsideration the Committee voted to give the national legislature discretion to es-
tablish lower courts, 2 FARRAND 125, a position later adopted by the Convention. But
see 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS
AND BE6INNINGS TO 1801, at 243 n.228 & 247 (1971).
29. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 26, § 1580, at 404.
30. 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 125. See also Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven,
II (originally published on Dec. 25, 1788, in the New Haven Gazette), reprinted in
EssAYs oN THE CoNsTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 237, 241 (P. Ford ed. 1892) [here-
inafter cited as ESSAYS]; Webster, An Examination Into the Leading Principles of the
Federal Constitution Proposed By the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia. With
Answers to the Principal Objections that Have Been Raised Against the System (originally
published on Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
NITED STATrES 24, 53 (P. Ford ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as PAMPHLETS].
31. The relevant text of Article III is set forth in the text at p. 501 supra.
32. 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 246.
33. Id. at 247.
34. Id,
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Professor Goebel's interpretation of the words in their 1787 con-
text suggests another approach to the question whether lower federal
courts must exist, one that emphasizes the context in which Article
III was written. If this approach fails the Hart-Wechsler view must
prevail, for, based solely on the debates at the Constitutional Con-
vention, their position seems to have the edge over those of Justice
Story and Professor Goebel. Viewing the compromise in context,
however, it is doubtful that the lower federal courts are dispensable.
B. A New Thesis
The traditional position on abolition of the lower federal courts
relies exclusively on an interpretation of one discrete compromise at
the Convention. It thus ignores other constitutional realities that
suggest that the lower federal courts cannot be abolished. If that
argument is to have contemporary validity, it must come to terms
with circumstances affecting the framers' decision and their view of
the national judiciary's functions. If, because of changing circum-
stances, the framers' aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be
fulfilled today without lower federal courts,3 5 then there is a con-
flict between the Hart and Wechsler view of the decision to leave
creation of lower courts to Congress' whim and the constitutional
definition of the judiciary's role. Ignoring the compromise empha-
sized by Hart and Wechsler would involve abandonment of a for-
mulation not central to the constitutional scheme. The existence
of lower federal courts since the first Congress suggests that the
terms of the compromise are not essential to the constitutional plan.
On the other hand a decision to limit the legitimate role of the na-
tional judiciary would weaken one branch of government, perhaps
fatally. The critical functions performed by the lower courts 6 sug-
gest their continued vitality may be, in Learned Hand's phrase,
"essential to prevent the defeat of the venture at hand . . 37
35. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934). These cases support the propriety, perhaps even
the necessity, of reinterpreting early constitutional formulations in light of changed
circumstances. See also note 51 infra. Even so fervent an advocate of judicial restraint
as Professor Phillip Kurland has recognized that changed conditions may require broad-
ening the federal judiciary's constitutional role. In the context of the executive branch's
expansion in modern times and the threat posed by such enlargement to our consti-
tutional system, he states, "[T]he Court would remain true to its function of preserving
the original meaning of the Constitution if it were to act more aggressively to help
prevent the executive from overreaching his constitutionally limited function." P.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 17 (1970).
36. See pp. 510-13 infra.
37. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (writing of judicial review). Judge
Friendly rejects the view that the constitutional grant of federal jurisdiction could
be allocated without creating lower federal courts. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL VIEw 7-13 (1973).
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The national judiciary was intended to perform a number of roles.
Perhaps the most central is its power to check the other two branches
of government.38 The Supreme Court inhibits attempts by the other
branches to overstep constitutionally mandated boundaries of au-
thority. Two other functions of the national judiciary are closely re-
lated. First, it is the judiciary's task to achieve uniformity of decision
on questions of national concern.39 Second, a national judiciary helps
ensure that federal interests take precedence over those of any par-
ticular state in matters of federal competence. The framers' interest
in institutionalizing these two functions is best illustrated by the
colonies' judicial endeavors during the Revolutionary War.
During the war the colonies commissioned vessels to harass British
shipping. General Washington sought guidance from the Continental
Congress regarding the disposition of booty acquired in successful
harassments,40 suggesting that courts be established to handle dis-
bursement of the prizes.41 The Continental Congress resolved 42 that
state courts should handle prizes and provided an appeal to the
Congress from state court determinations. At first, review was by
congressional committee, but in 1781 Congress established the Court
of Appeals in Cases of Capture. 43 This court and its predecessor, the
congressional committee, were necessary because some overexuberant
privateers had seized ships belonging to neutrals 44 and state courts
were not always sympathetic to neutrals' claims. 45 Since the Con-
tinental Congress was seeking the assistance of neutrals, it created a
national tribunal to prevent state authorities from hindering that
effort. This example of protecting the united interest over that of a
particular state46 and of a mechanism to assure some degree of
38. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 8-16 (1969); G. DIETIE, THE
FEDERALIST 172 (1960). This has been disputed by Professor Crosskey. For a statement
of Crosskey's position and an effective refutation see R. BERGER, supra at 19-20.
39. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 124; 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 532 (1836) [here-
inafter cited as ELLIOT].
40. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 5 n.18; J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 147.
41. S. BLOOM, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
347-48 (1940).
42. For an explanation of the legal effect of a "resolve" by the Continental Con-
gress see J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 146.
43. There is some doubt as to the court's legality since the Articles of Confederation
had not yet been accepted by all the states. Id. at 164.
44. Id. Concern over state indiscretions in prize cases was still present at the Con-
stitutional Convention. The Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, and Alexander Hamil-
ton's Plan expressly provided for federal jurisdiction in capture cases. I FARRAN), supra
note 23, at 22, 244, 292.
45. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 494 (Wilson at Pennsylvania deliberations).
46. See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 532 (Madison at Virginia deliberations); I
FARRAND, supra note 23, at 316 (Madison); Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer, Letter III,
reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 30, at 294, 309.
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decisional uniformity was clearly a factor in shaping the notion of
a national judiciary as developed at the Convention.
National courts were also to provide a forum in which foreigners,
out-of-state litigants, 47 and the new government itself might get a
fair hearing.48 The lawyers at the Constitutional Convention were
well aware of the local biases of state courts. 49 Finally, the new
government would need a judiciary of its own to ensure proper im-
plementation of its laws.50
The list of functions could be extended, an exercise not neces-
sary for present purposes. 51 There was, however, at least one other
vital function: The national judiciary was intended, perhaps above
all else, to be able to hear and do justice in all cases within its
jurisdiction. In the 1780's, not unlike today, "[c]ourts were thought
of in part . . . as instruments for the protection of individuals.
'3 2
Two of the most influential delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion stressed the federal judiciary's role as a protector of citizens. At
the Convention itself Gouverneur Morris stated that everyone had
witnessed "excesses against personal liberty, private property and
personal safety."53 In one of the Federalist Papers Hamilton em-
phasized that the courts must protect individuals from legislative
tyranny:
Limitations on legislative authority can be preserved in prac-
tice no other way than through the medium of the courts of
justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all reser-
vations of particular rights or privileges would amount to noth-
ing.54
47. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 17; 2 ELLIOT 492-93 (Wilson at Pennsylvania de-
liberations).
48. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 46 (Randolph); Hanson, Remarks on the
Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, Addressed to the Citizens of the United
States (originally published Jan. 1, 1788, under pen name Aristedes), reprinted in
PAMPHLETS, supra note 30, at 217, 238; Ellsworth, The Landholder V (originally pub-
lished Dec. 3, 1787, in the Connecticut Courant), reprinted in EssAys, supra note 30,
at 159.
49. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 206.
50. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 469 (Wilson at Pennsylvania deliberations).
2 FARRANn, supra note 23, at 46 (Randolph); THE FEDERALISr No. 80, at 515-16 (Mod.
Lib. ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
51. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 12-18.
52. Id. at 6 n.19.
53. 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 512.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961). See G. DiETZE, supra note
38, at 172. James Madison also argued that the new government must make provision
for the protection of individual rights. BATOR, supra note 11, at 6 n.19 (quoting
Madison). Madison noted that the need for steady dispensation of justice was one
fact which "more perhaps than anything else, produced this convention." 1 FARRAND
134.
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The state ratification debates also indicate that it was commonly
assumed that the federal judiciary would vindicate private rights with-
in the federal jurisdiction.5 The diversity jurisdiction in the Con-
stitution was designed to give litigants a chance to obtain an im-
partial tribunal.50 There was no suggestion that the national ju-
diciary or Congress had the power to choose which of the rights set
forth in the text of the Constitution would be vindicated. At the
Virginia deliberations on the proposed constitution, Supreme Court
jurisdiction was said to be intended "to prevent injustice by cor-
recting the erroneous decisions of local subordinate tribunals . . .,57
This can only mean to do justice in each individual case which falls
under the federal jurisdiction, even if by appellate review.58
This emphasis on the national judiciary's role as vindicator of
private and individual rights strongly suggests that the framers in-
tended that national tribunals would hear each case within the federal
judicial power. Hamilton is again instructive:
The evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the
causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons
receive their original or final determination in the courts of
the Union.5"
There can be little doubt that the early Supreme Court did in fact
supply a final determination of those cases appealed to it, no matter
how trivial the matter might appear from a national perspective. 0°
The judiciary would also be unable to check legislative abuses
if its jurisdiction were limitable at the discretion of Congress."i To
assume that the framers desired both to control the legislature by
means of the federal courts and to give the legislature a method for
nullifying such control by a simple majority vote approving a juris-
dictional statute is "to charge them with chasing their tails around
a stump. '0
2
55. See R. BERGER, supra note 38, at 16-20.
56. See 2 ELLTOT, supra note 39, at 491 (XVilson at Pennsylvania deliberations).
57. 3 ELLIOT 518 (Pendleton at Virginia deliberations).
58. See id. at 535 (Madison suggesting federal appellate jurisdiction will guard
against local prejudice).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 494 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961).
60. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTENIP.
PROD. 3, 17 (1948). This view of the Supreme Court was dominant for many years. It
led some to resist in 1891 the establishment of intermediate federal appellate tribunals.
F. FRANKFURTER &. J. LANDis, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 258 (1928).
61. Raoul Berger believes restraining state and federal legislative bodies was a
reason for creating the federal judiciary. R. BERGER, supra note 38, at 8-16, 336. His
view has substantial support. See note 38 supra.
62. Berger makes this argument in support of his thesis that judicial review is im-
plicit in the constitutional scheme. R. BERGER 336-37.
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A compelling indication that the framers intended the federal ju-
diciary to be capable of affording a forum for all cases within its
jurisdiction comes from an omission from Article III. Neither the
final arrangement nor any of the five judiciary plans submitted to
the Convention gave federal courts authority to decline to hear a
case. 63 Discretionary review by the Supreme Court did not originate
until 1925. 64 The framers' failure to confer, or even consider confer-
ring, discretionary review powers upon courts suggests that federal
tribunals, including the Supreme Court, were thought capable of
providing a forum in all cases within their jurisdiction. 5
One is tempted to ask how the framers could both intend the
federal judiciary to be capable of hearing all cases within its juris-
diction and at the same time not explicitly incorporate inferior
federal courts into the constitutional scheme. The answer is that
the founding fathers felt that the right to appellate review by the
Supreme Court would be sufficient to ensure that all litigants with
cases within the federal constitutional jurisdiction would have their
cases heard by a national tribunal.00 This faith in the availability
of Supreme Court review was in evidence at the Constitutional Con-
vention.0 7 Rutledge employed it as a rationale for not including any
lower federal courts in the constitutional scheme.1 Luther Martin
explained to his fellow Marylanders that he did not think that lower
federal courts were necessary because, "by giving an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the general government would
have a sufficient check over [state] decisions and security for the en-
forcing of their laws .... ,,0 Undoubtedly the same confidence was
63. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 20-22 (Virginia plan); 3 id. at 106-23, 595-610
(Pinckney plan); I id. at 242-45 (Paterson plan); 1 id. at 291-93, 617-30 (Hamilton plan);
2 id. at 432 (Blair plan). See also 2 id. at 136.
64. Although statutory certiorari was first employed at the Supreme Court level as
an appellate procedure in 1891, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, 828; D. CtiuRr,
FEDERAL Courrs 217 (1968), it was not used to curtail the right to Supreme Court re-
view until passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (Judges' Bill); R. ROBERTSON
& F. KIRKHAM, JURtsDICIION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES § 310, at
589 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland eds. 1951). In the 1891 act certiorari expanded rather
than contracted Supreme Court review. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note
60, at 261; R. ROB'RTSON & F. KIRKHAM, supra § 310, at 589-90. See also Act of Sept.
6, 1916, ch. 448, § 237, 39 Stat. 726 (giving Supreme Court discretion to decline to
hear criminal appeals in which federal contentions had been rejected by state courts).
65. One indication of the common understanding that appeal to a federal tribunal
on a federal matter would be as of right is Alexander Hamilton's argument that the
creation of lower federal courts "would obviate the necessity of having recourse to the
Supreme Court in every case of federal cognizance." THE FED RAiLIST No. 81, at 485
(New Am. Lib. ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
66. The exceptions clause in Article III does not necessarily reflect a contrary view.
See J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 240.
67. See Warren, supra note 4, at 64-67.
68. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 124.
69. 3 FARRAND 206.
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a major factor in the acquiescence of some in the deletion of man-
datory inferior tribunals at the Convention.
Others expressed a similar sentiment by noting that they expected
few federal cases. If there were to be only a few cases, it is clear
that the Supreme Court, by appellate review, would have been
capable of exercising the "judicial power of the United States" ef-
fectively. Roger Sherman, a delegate to the Convention from Con-
necticut, later wrote that "it is not probable that more than one
citizen to a thousand will even have a cause that can come before
a federal court." 70 Alexander Hanson, a Maryland federalist, also felt
that there would be few federal actions. 71 Soon after the Convention,
James Madison wrote to George Washington, "The great mass of
suits in every State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate to mat-
ters not of federal cognizance." 72 With but few exceptions73  the
framers felt that the federal judiciary, due to the constitutional
limits on the subject matter of its jurisdiction, would peacefully co-
exist with state courts, handling only those few cases of federal
concern.
74
Thus commentary at the time of the passage of the Constitution
suggests that underlying the exercise of the other functions of the
federal judiciary was the notion that the federal courts, whatever
their form, could be expected to hear any litigant whose case was
within the federal constitutional jurisdiction, either at trial or on ap-
peal. This view is buttressed by the lack of any provision in the
Constitution giving the federal courts discretionary jurisdiction. The
federal forum may have been limited to appellate review, but it was
to be available in all cases.
The framers' apparent willingness to limit the federal role to an
appellate role in the form of Supreme Court review was perfectly
understandable at the time. Without question, the Supreme Court
70. Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, I (essay originally published on Dec. 25, 1788,
in the New Haven Gazette), reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 30, at 241.
71. As the rod of Aaron once swallowed up the rods of the Egyptian inagi, so
also is it feared, that these federal courts, will, at length, swallow up the state
tribunals. A miracle, in one case, is as necessary, as in the other.
But let not the officers of state courts be overmuch alarmedl The causes, which,
by possibility, may be instituted in the federal courts bear no comparison to the
rest.
Hanson, supra note 48, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 30, at 239 (footnote omitted).
72. 3 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 130.
73. See, e.g., Mason, Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution, reprinted in
PAMPHLETS, supra note 30, at 327, 329-30. See also W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 192 (1905).
74. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra; ELLSWORTH, supra note 48, reprinted in
Esstvs, supra note 30, at 159; Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New
Constitution, Recommended by the Late Convention (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS 333,
343; Webster, supra note 30, reprinted in PAMPHLETS 24, 53.
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was then capable of providing a forum for all federal cases. Between
1789 and 1801 the Supreme Court disposed of fewer than 90 cases.75
During the first four terms of the Court, not a single case was ar-
gued.7 6 Since the Court's jurisdiction was not discretionary, ;7 any
litigant whose case fell within the federal judicial power and who was
determined to have a federal forum hear his case could have had
such a forum even in the absence of lower federal courts.
Since the early days of the republic, however, the number of
federal cases has increased dramatically. During the 1972 term alone
the Supreme Court wrote full opinions in 164 cases,78 while dispos-
ing of 3,748 cases.70 This increase in case load has had significant
consequences for both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
The Supreme Court is clearly no longer capable of providing a
federal forum to hear the merits of every case involving a federal
question."0 If Congress were to abolish the lower federal courts,
this aspect of the national judiciary's role would fall upon the Su-
preme Court in the form of review of state court decisions. The
inevitable result would be that few litigants with federal claims
could be heard in a federal court even on appeal.8 ' The burden
of Article III, as understood by the framers, would fall upon one
court-the Supreme Court.
As the federal caseload has grown the role of lower federal courts
75. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 28, at 802-13.
76. See I L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ThE
UNITED STATES 42 (1969). The leisurely pace of Supreme Court practice as late as 1848
is set forth in Lowry, The Supreme Court in 1848 & 1938: A Review of Two Terms,
23 So. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1950). In 1848, the Court decided only 36 cases. Id. at 460.
77. In addition to the absence of certiorari as a device for declining to hear a case,
a litigant in 1789 did not have to face the current technique of dismissal of an ap-
peal for want of a substantial federal question. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 92-96.
78. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1973).
79. Id. at 306.
80. Judge Friendly has noted that Supreme Court review is even inadequate to
protect federal civil rights. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 102-03. The expansion of
federal habeas corpus in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), "is usually thought to
rest primarily on the assumption that constitutional rights cannot be adequately pro-
tected by direct Supreme Court review of state court judgments resulting in detention."
BATOR, supra note 11, at 1475. See Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 86-87 (1965); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
461,464, 501 (1960).
81. The burden on the Supreme Court would be intolerable, constitutionally and
physically. It is worth noting that the recent debate on the proposed National Court
of Appeals has concentrated on the question of whether the Supreme Court can per-
form the two functions of selecting issues and deciding cases in an appropriately con-
templative manner. Compare Freund, Why lWe Need the National Court of Appeals,
59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973), with Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent,
40 U. CI. L. REV. 473 (1973); Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent,
59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: A
Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 842 (1973); and Address by Earl Warren to the
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., May 1, 1973.
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has undergone change. Today the lower federal courts are more than
mere federal trial forums for cases falling within the Article III
jurisdictional grant. First, in those instances where the Supreme
Court makes a pronouncement of nation-wide impact regarding fed-
eral rights or interests, the lower courts are needed to enforce and
apply it. Moreover, as Supreme Court review becomes more selec-
tive, the lower courts have become the primary vindicators of federal
rights.8
2
Cases which dramatically affect the legal system are by now com-
monplace. Miranda v. Arizona,83 United States v. Wade,84 and Gideon
v. Wainwright85 affected and continue to affect the outcome in an
enormous number of cases. In the noncriminal area, the reappor-
tionment and desegregation decisions have generated hundreds of
lower court cases.8 6 If the burden of enforcing such important de-
cisions and resolving all the subsidiary questions were left to the
Supreme Court, it is doubtful that the task could be performed.
Judge Carl McGowan has noted the increased latitude available to
the Supreme Court in desegregation cases simply because the lower
federal courts are there for enforcement and implementation func-
tions: 8 7
The promulgation of those principles [announced in Brown
v. Board of Education] would have provided an infinitely more
daunting prospect in the absence of the machinery provided by
the inferior federal courts. Their performance in the discharge
of this difficult task has been less than even, but is it conceivable
that the job could have been entrusted entirely to the state
courts, bearing in mind the differences in loyalties and the vul-
nerability to local pressures inherent in an elective system of
judges? The federal judges themselves have, even with the se-
curity provided them by the Constitution, found the going hard.
82. As one might guess, there is no discussion of this eventuality by the framers,
for they at least publicly claimed that the number of cases within the federal judicial
power would be few. Hamilton, however, was of the view that the lower federal courts
were to be the first line of defense in protecting the liberties and rights secured to
individuals by the Constitution:
We have seen, that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be con-
fined to two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other
cases of federal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to the in-
ferior [federal] tribunals; and the Supreme Court would have nothing more than
an appellate jurisdiction ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
84. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 18-19.
87. C. McGowAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL PowR IN THE UNITED STATES 15
(1967).
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It is not fanciful to think that it would have been too much
for unsheltered state judges . . . Certainly it would have been
hard to have asked them to risk such an exposure with so few
shields. s8
Similarly, the success of innovative Supreme Court action in other
areas, such as reapportionment and criminal procedure, has rested
in substantial part upon the support of the lower federal courts.8 9
The lower federal courts are even more important where the Su-
preme Court chooses to remain silent. To a significant extent the
contemporary guarantors of federal rights are not the nine Supreme
Court Justices but the judges of the district courts and courts of ap-
peals. 90 The lower judges are not authorized to decline to hear a
federal matter within their jurisdiction.9 1 Hundreds of important
issues are determined with practical finality by lower federal judges.1
2
During the 1949 Term it was said that the Court failed to consider
on the merits a number of cases "which raised the most vital con-
stitutional problems that could be presented to any court in a demo-
cratic country." 3 No doubt the same could be said of more recent
terms.
94
Caseload increases also have a related effect on the Supreme
Court's theoretical role. The heavy use of the Justices' discretion to
determine what few cases the Court will hear on the merits makes
it impossible to maintain the fiction that every litigant has the right
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 17-18.
90. For a few years Professor Harper and others collected and discussed the im-
pottant cases which the Supreme Court had declined to hear. See Harper & Leibowitz,
What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 427
(1954); Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1953); Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did
Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. Rv. 354 (1951); Harper & Rosenthal,
What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 293 (1950).
91. It is true that under the abstention doctrine a federal court may dcline to
consider a matter when it appears that state courts will afford full justice. H. FRIENDLY,
supra note 37, at 95. Abstention is not, however, a denial or surrender of jurisdiction
but an exercise of federal restraint pending the outcome of the state proceeding. If
state law determines the result, the issue is mooted and federal judicial resources
conserved by the operation of the doctrine. Abstention is not, in theory, a method
for federal courts to decline to hear federal matters; it is, rather, a delaying tech-
nique pending resolution of state issues. See Note, Federal.Question Abstention: Justice
Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REV. 604 (1967).
92. In 1967, thirteen years after Brown, Judge Wisdom noted that, even in so
important an area as de facto segregation, the lower courts were the main policy-
making tribunals. Wisdom, The Frzctionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of Federal
Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411, 426 (1967).
93. Harper & Rosenthal, supra note 90, at 323. The Vinson Court's response to
McCarthyism was to deny certiorari "in the cases presenting the most fundamental,
substantive challenges to the investigatory power." R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SU-
PREME COURT 73 (1972).
94. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
979 (1972) (constitutionality of United States involvement in the Vietnam War).
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to resort to the Court for vindication of his federal claim.95 The Court
can no longer resolve all federal cases. The Court's role today, by
necessity, is to service issues rather than to do justice for all litigants.
Justice Frankfurter, before he served on the Court, wrote that the
essential functions of the Supreme Court are "[to] resolve conflicts
among coordinate appellate tribunals and to determine matters of na-
tional concern."9 7 Indeed, the Court's own rule govering giants of
certiorari reveals a bias toward issues rather than litigants and their
particular rights. 9s
This shift in the Supreme Court's function has meant that it must
decline to hear most cases. The modern Court has no qualms about
refusing to decide a case or controversy even when it has jurisdiction
to do so. It may prefer to hear a case in which a particular issue is
presented in a "clean-cut" manner, 99 on a more complete record,10 0
or simply under "more appropriate circumstances."' 0 1 Whatever one
thinks of such techniques, they illustrate the modern Court's under-
standing of its function.
It is thus no longer reasonable to assert that Congress may simply
abolish the lower federal courts. When Supreme Court review of
all cases within Article III jurisdiction was possible, lower federal
courts were perhaps unnecessary. As federal caseloads grew, how-
ever, lower federal courts became necessary components of the na-
tional judiciary if the constitutional duty of case by case considera-
tion of all federal cases was to be fulfilled. It can now be asserted
that their existence in some form is constitutionally required. 10 2
95. See note 60 supra.
96. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 60, at 257; R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRK-
1HAM, supra note 64, at 588-89.
97. F. FPNKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 60, at 257. Professor Charles Miller defined
the modern Supreme Court's role as follows:
The Supreme Court performs two overlapping roles in American political life.
The first is to maintain and enunciate a political-legal order through formal ad-
judication. The second is to preserve the social-political bonds of the nation.
C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 189 (1969). See also C. SWISHER,
THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 171-89 (rev. ed. 1965). A dramatic illustration
of the fact that the Court is no longer seen as an organ to protect all rights is the
proposal of the Federal Judicial Center Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme
Court. See note 81 supra.
98. Supreme Court Rule 19 states, in part: "A review on writ of certiorari is not
a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where
there are special and important reasons therefor." Sup. Ct. Rule 19(1).
99. Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947).
100. See Simmons v. West Haven Housing Authority, 399 U.S. 510, 511 (1970); In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 384 U.S. 809 (1948).
101. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1969); Naim v. Naim, 850 U.S. 891
(1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956). Compare Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), with Epperson
v. Arkansas, 593 U.S. 97 (1968).
102. A similar line of reasoning was employed by Professor Hart in his well-known
argument that, although the "exception clause" of Article III gives Congress much
power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, Congress cannot wield that
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II. Congressional Control of Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
The conclusion that lower federal courts must exist, though of
singular importance, really marks the beginning of a more serious
inquiry into the scope of mandatory federal court jurisdiction. While
Congress does not have unfettered control over lower court juris-
diction such that it could in effect abolish the courts by obliterating
their jurisdiction, it is also clear that some degree of congressional
control, consistent with the Constitution, is valid.
Just as the text of Article III is inconclusive in determining
whether Congress may abolish lower federal courts in 1973,103 it
also provides little guidance with respect to the scope of congressional
authority over inferior federal court jurisdiction. Article III states
that the judicial power shall extend to enumerated classes of cases.
1U4
While this might be taken to imply the Congress must give some
federal court or courts jurisdiction in all cases outlined in Article
III, it is not clear whether vesting discretionary jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court to hear all federal cases would saiisfy such a require-
ment.
Article III's silence on the scope of congressional control over the
lower federal courts does not mean there is no guidance on the matter.
The considerations that underlie the conclusion reached in Part I
have jurisdictional implications as well: The federal forums man-
dated by them must be invested with jurisdiction to hear federal
issues. Other constitutional provisions and the manner in which they
interact with jurisdictional statutes provide further guidance.
A. Congressional Power to Restrict Jurisdiction to Avoid Case Over-
loads and Promote Efficiency
It is tempting to conclude that Congress must give the lower courts
power to hear all cases within the federal judiciary's constitutionally
defined jurisdiction. Under such a theory failure by the Federal Ju-
power so as to destroy the Court's essential role in the constitutional scheme. See
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1362 (1953). Compare I M. CROSSKEY, supra note 27, at 616, with Lee, Letters
of a Federal Farmer, Letter III (pamphlet originally published Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted
in PAMPHLErs, supra note 30, at 308.
The Supreme Court was a vehicle for implementing the accepted policy of having a
national judiciary. Whatever Professor Hart based his argument upon-the corner-
stone appears to be a separation of powers theory-it is implausible that the Con-
stitution allows Congress to destroy the essence of that which the Court represents,
the national judiciary. Professor Hart's thesis therefore suggests that Congress cannot
destroy an essential role of the national judiciary. See R. BERGR, supra note 38, at 18-19.
103. See p. 502 supra.
104. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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dicial Code to grant lower federal courts the jurisdiction enumerated
in Article III is unconstitutional. There are three principal classes
of such cases. A litigant whose federal question or diversity claim
involves less than $10,000 and does not fit within one of the juris-
dictional sections not requiring the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
has no chance of obtaining a federal forum other than the Supreme
Court. 105 Second, the defendant in a state criminal prosecution will
in the normal case be unable to present his federal trial defenses to
a lower federal court. Finally, there is a class of cases which arise
under the Constitution or laws of the United States as these words
are used in the Constitution but do not arise under the Constitu-
tion or laws within the statutory grant of federal question jurisdic-
tion.1"' Since Supreme Court review of state decisions is inadequate
in today's world to fulfill the national judiciary's role of doing
justice in particular cases, these classes of cases suggest that the cur-
rent jurisdictional scheme is inconsistent with the original goals.
The conclusion on which the foregoing is based, however, is a
faulty one. The availability of a federal lower court forum for each
case should be sacrificed only when providing such a forum would
seriously undermine the judicial system. An overabundance of fed-
eral forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases
could in fact undermine the judiciary. A number of factors suggest
the necessity for linedrawing. First, the expense of such a system
might make it impracticable. 07 Second, a large increase in the case-
load would inevitably mean an increase in the number of judges
and a decrease in the prestige attached to being a federal judge.
Many commentators, including Judge Friendly, have stated that such
prestige is needed if the federal bench is to continue to attract quali-
fied lawyers, especially in areas where private practice is more
lucrative.os "Any deterioration in the quality of the district judges
individually or of their performance collectively would destroy the
very values the fedeial court system is meant to attain."' 0 9
105. For example, in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the
Court noted that suits against federal officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional
rights must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Id. at 547. For a complete list
of those claims that would necessarily be cognizable under Article III should courts
insist on what Judge Friendly calls the "maximum model," see H. FRIENDLY, supra
note 37, at 12-13.
106. See, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Ritter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900); Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 161-63 (1953).
107. An early objection to the proposed Constitution was that the "expense of the
new plan is terrifying .... " Letters of Agrippa, I (Essay originally published in the
Mass. Gazette, Nov. 23, 1787), reprinted in EssAYs, supra note 30, at 54.
108. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 30.
109. Id. at 31. See also Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the
United States and State Courts, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 499, 515-16 (1928).
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Thus, it would appear that Congress has some Article III authority
to limit federal jurisdiction. The authority to curtail, however, is
limited by its origins. It cannot be used to restrict jurisdiction over
busing, reapportionment, or any other narrowly defined class of cases
that pose little threat to efficiency; such selective curtailments would
bear no rational relationship to the end sought, namely preservation
of the quality of federal justice. The power to curtail is limited to
prudent steps which help avoid case overloads.
In practice, the current jurisdictional scheme satisfies the above
principles remarkably well. Congress has provided a federal forum
for federal questions."1 A number of important federal rights are
covered by specific jurisdictional provisions which eliminate the
,$10,000 jurisdictional requirement."' The cases which fall under
the Article III jurisdictional grant but which today receive federal
court consideration only on review by the Supreme Court are con-
sistent with the suggested principle. They fall into three main classes:
(1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) federal question and diversity
cases with less than $10,000 in controversy; and (3) those cases in
which a federal question may be lurking in the background but
which do not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.112 The first class
presents no real difficulty because any state criminal defendant can
obtain a federal forum for his federal claims under prevailing federal
habeas law." 3 The second and third classes of cases are potentially
110. The Supreme Court has on occasion lent impetus to this trend. See Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (eliminating jurisdictional amount re-
quirement in civil rights cases); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (expanding avail-
ability of federal habeas corpus to state prisoners).
111. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344 (1970) (civil rights). A more complete list
may be found in BATOR, supra note 11, at 847-48. See also H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37,
at 121. Judge Friendly feels that there is no rationality in the classes of cases Congrcss
has chosen to except from the jurisdictional amount requirement. Id. at 122-23. See also
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 107-09 (1970).
112. See note 106 supra. By the brief treatment of this class of cases, I do not mean
to suggest that they are easily recognizable or explainable. See generally BATOR 850-90.
There is another class of diversity cases in which the full range of constitutional
jurisdiction is not vested. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), the diversity statute, has been con-
strued to require full diversity in cases involving multiple defendants. 2A MOORL'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.10, at 1660-61 (2d ed. 1972). Yet under the rule of State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), diversity between only two adverte
parties satisfies the constitutional diversity requirement. In this class of cases the
federal interest is so small that Congress could rationally act to prevent them from
clogging the district courts. See note 180 infra.
113. It should be noted that the framers did not contemplate so active a role in
state criminal proceedings as the federal courts have taken. They could not, for ex-
ample, contemplate application of the Bill of Rights to the states. See Barron v. Bal-
timore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Therefore, the absence for many years of a federal
forum for constitutional claims in state criminal cases is not inconsistent with what
we take to be their view of the national judiciary, see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
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so numerous that if Congress were required to create enough federal
courts to hear them or to confer such jurisdiction on the existing
federal courts, the courts would be swamped or the judiciary would
have to be expanded to a dangerous extent. 14
The restrictions in all three classes of cases have additional char-
acteristics which make them acceptable devices for limiting federal
jurisdiction. The $10,000 jurisdictional requirement is, in an im-
portant sense, a neutral scheme of jurisdictional withdrawal. It would
not seem to prevent the lower federal system from hearing any par-
ticular federal issue and thus avoids the possibility of substantive
lawmaking by jurisdictional manipulation.l1a There is a difference
in kind between limiting the amount in controversy without regard
to subject matter and foreclosing jurisdiction to hear, for example,
desegregation actions. The latter has the immediate effect of rele-
gating consideration of a particular federal question to state courts
and the remote possibility of Supreme Court review. Thus lack of
jurisdiction with respect to some federal question cases cannot jus-
tify limiting federal jurisdiction with respect to particular issues.
Federal question and diversity cases involving less than $10,000
and lurking federal question cases arguably involve less vital federal
interests as classes of cases than do other potential areas for juris-
diction restriction.1 " The third class, involving as it does cases in
which a federal question may be lurking but does not arise under
the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be restricted for the same reasons that
the abstention doctrine is permissibly employed. That is to say, until
the federal question has become clear the federal courts can avoid
what is essentially a matter within the responsibility of the state
courts.
There is a similar ground on which the failure to extend district
court jurisdiction in another class of cases can be justified. In state
supra note 60, at 109, for, although federal forums must be available to vindicate
federal rights, those rights that are of federal or constitutional cognizance may of
course change over time. Modern federal habeas doctrine makes federal forums avail-
able for state prisoners' constitutional claims.
114. As to the potentially enormous number of cases in the "lurking" federal ques-
tion class of cases, see Mishkin, supra note 106, at 162. The jurisdictional amount limit
has been the traditional method of keeping dockets uncluttered. See BATOR, supra note
I1, at 847-49; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 60, at 93-94, 139.
115. See pp. 523-25 infra.
116. Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Con-
troversy, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1960). This Note analogizes the jurisdictional amount
to a small claims exemption. It argues that such a restriction allows the "federal courts
to devote adequate attention to 'important' matters by keeping small claims off the
dockets." Id.
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criminal proceedings it is often not clear at the outset whether a
federal question will be involved. Sometimes a federal question does
not become apparent until the defense has coalesced and even then
it may be difficult to determine whether the "federal" matter will
determine the outcome. Unless it does even the Supreme Court
could not overturn a conviction." 7 To require original federal juris-
diction in all these cases would be extremely wasteful. The state
courts here perform a useful sifting function by narrowing the class
of cases that require federal review to those that in fact turn upon
federal issues.
Thus the $10,000 jurisdictional amount limit in federal question
and diversity cases, which was enacted to relieve the burden on the
federal courts,"18 is a constitutional exercise of congressional au-
thority. Similarly, congressional refusal to extend federal question
jurisdiction to all cases in which the Constitution might authorize
it can be viewed as preserving the federal courts' essential role by
not extending their reach to a ruinous number of cases. The salient
features of these current restrictions are neutrality, efficiency, and
some weighing of interests. They provide useful guidelines for Con-
gress' exercise of its power to protect the courts. For instance, the
legitimate end of efficiency may be served by a limiting statute
without undue sacrifice of what should be the dominant theme in
the jurisdictional structure-federal court availability. Nevertheless,
adherence to any one goal does not ensure that a given jurisdictional
restriction will be proper. There is a limit to how far Congress can
go in the name of efficiency. A provision precluding federal court
jurisdiction in all federal question cases would have a dramatic im-
pact on caseloads, but the cost in terms of availability would be
too great. Nor will "neutrality" always guarantee propriety. A statute
excluding every second case filed in district court would, of course,
reduce caseloads and achieve total neutrality-every issue would
eventually be heard in federal court. Its failure to assess the impor-
tance of the interests involved, however, would render it so ar-
bitrary as surely to be unconstitutional.
B. Congressional Power to Curtail Jurisdiction Because of Sub-
stantive Disagreement With Judicial Decisions
The jurisdictional limitations thus far considered are different from
those mentioned at the outset of this article. The proposed statutes
117. See Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); Murdock v. Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
118. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 39-40.
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restricting jurisdiction over reapportionment, desegregation, and bus-
ing cases have little in common with the $10,000 jurisdictional re-
quirement. They were inspired by something other than regard for
judicial efficiency. As these examples suggest, in practice it has not
been difficult to distinguish legislation motivated by efficiency con-
siderations from political reaction." 19 Sponsors could not seriously em-
phasize the beneficial effect of busing curbs on overcrowded dockets.
Such proposals are frank attempts to alter or neutralize substantive
federal decisions,120 motives which on one occasion arguably led the
Court to strike down a jurisdictional statute.' 2 1 These proposed
statutes focus directly on a controversial area. Because of their nar-
row scope the considerations that warrant permitting Congress broad
119. In an earlier confrontation between branches of government, the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee chastized President Roosevelt for attempting to "pack" the Supreme
Court under the guise of adding judges to increase court efficiency. S. REP. No. 711,
75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937).
120. Sponsors have not masked their intentions. Consider Senator Jenner's remarks
on why he introduced legislation to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in sub-
versive activity cases, supra note 8:
It was introduced because I had become gravely concerned by what appeared to
be the self-evident fact that we had a runaway Supreme Court to deal with.
[T]here had been a long line of cases, involving Communists and subversive ac-
tivity, in which the Court had accepted, point after point, the legal propositions
advanced by the Communists, until we arrived at a point where it seemed to me
Congressional action was inescapably required.
Accordingly, I drafted a bill to withdraw appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme
Court ....
104 CONG. REc. 18635, 18636 (1958). Senator Butler, who proposed an amendment to
the Jenner Bill, explained his reasons as follows:
[The] proposed legislation . . . is before the Senate because the people of this
country are greatly troubled and widely dissatisfied with the results of a series
of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States which have gone beyond
the Court's proper sphere ....
Id. at 18646.
Sponsors of the Tuck Bill, supra note 10, were no less candid. Senator Thurmond,
who introduced the bill in the Senate, was concerned solely with the consequences
of the reapportionment decisions:
[T]here is a necessity for urgent action on this question. Almost all of the States
of the Union can be reconstructed by judicial fiat if these decisions are implemented
across the board. The resulting chaos would be detrimental to the continuance
of sound governmental practices in these States.
110 CONG. REc. 22097 (1964). His co-sponsors were equally unconcerned with promoting
efficiency:
The Supreme Court, by entering into the political field of the internal organiza-
tion of the States, has engaged in changing the Constitution by usurpation.
Id. at 22098 (Sen. Robertson). See also id. at 22101-02 (Sen. Stennis).
Senator Ervin, chief spokesman for passage of § 702(a) of Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act (see note 123 infra), which would have withheld federal habeas
relief from state prisoners, explained that that provision was designed to eliminate
dilatory habeas petitions and to maintain the independence of state criminal justice. 114
CONG. REc. 14182 (1968).
Finally, President Nixon's busing bills, supra note 13, were designed to "place firm
and effective curbs on busing." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES REL.-
'lIVE TO BUSING AND EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, AND TRANSMITTING A DAFT
OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE A MORATORIUM ON NEW AND ADDITIONAL STUDENT
'RANSPORTATION, H.R. Doc. No. 92-195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
121. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). See pp. 525-31 infra.
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discretion to avoid case overloads are no longer controlling. As the
subject matter of a statute narrows, the logistical stakes involved in
conferring or denying federal jurisdiction diminish. The quality, ef-
ficiency, and expense of a judiciary are always relevant considera-
tions, but in the context of most of these statutes their weight is
de minimis.
122
While many previously proposed statutes are easily characterized
as neutral or substantive, there is, of course, no clear line between
the two kinds of jurisdictional statutes.123 A useful approach for
122. It is true that the busing cases have consumed and continue to consume an
enormous amount of judicial time and resources. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 18-19.
I would argue that a statute which based a curtailment of jurisdiction to hear desegre-
gation cases upon the advantages of such a move in terms of court dockets would
fail because the primary motive was transparent and impermissible. For discussions
of the difficulties connected with testing a statute's constitutionality by a determination
of the motives behind its enactment see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Rav. 95; Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970). Professor Ely argues that, while in most situations where government action
is challenged considerations of motive should play no part in a court's decision, there
is a class of cases where inquiry about motive is appropriate. In speaking about
federal jurisdictional statutes Professor Ely says:
If a statute denying jurisdiction in a certain class of cases can be shown to be
the product of a desire by a majority of those voting for it to deny citizens the
protection of a certain constitutional right, the court should insist upon a defense
of the choice in terms which rationally relate the choice to an acceptable goal
and are unrelated to the inhibition of the right in issue. It would be impossible
to infer such a forbidden motivation from the setting of a jurisdictional amount
applicable to all sorts of cases. An inference of unconstitutional motivation might,
moreover, on rare occasion be rebutted by a showing that some adequate alterna-
tive means of ensuring protection of the right exists, and Congress knew of it. But
where the inference of intent to curtail the enforcement of a constitutionally
guaranteed right is solid, and no alternative legitimate justification suggests itself
-and one seldom would-the Court should invalidate the statute, "jurisdictional"
though it may be.
Id. at 1308-09 (footnotes omitted).
123. It is possible to imagine a law that falls neatly into both categories. A single
statute might deal with many different categories of cases. No such jurisdictional pro-
vision has been found. Another is a statute dealing with federal habeas corpus cases
for state prisoners, a class of cases with some substantive unity but large enough to
have a substantial impact on lower court caseloads. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 18.
As mentioned before, § 702(a) of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets bill, S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), would have terminated federal habeas
corpus for state prisoners:
The judgment of a court of a State upon a plea or verdict of guilty in a criminal
action shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact which were
determined, or which could have been determined, in that action until such judg-
ment is reversed, vacated, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to review
by appeal or certiorari such judgment; and neither the Supreme Court nor any
inferior court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the
Constitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to reverse, vacate, or
modify any such judgment of a State court except upon appeal from, or writ of
certiorari granted to review, a determination made with respect to such judgment
upon review thereof by the highest court of that State having jurisdiction to re-
view such judgment.
This Section was eliminated by the Senate. 114 CoNG. REc. 14171-84 (1968).
Such a provision must be analyzed not only in terms of Congress' jurisdictional
power, but also in relation to Article I, § 9, of the Constitution, which prohibits sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus except in emergencies. See Eisenstrager v. For-
restal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1963).
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dealing with such statutes is to consider jurisdictional statutes on a
continuous spectrum. At one end are clear efforts to promote effi-
ciency and avoid case overloads. Such statutes should be judged
largely by the factors already discussed. At the other end are blatant
efforts to alter or reduce the impact of judicial results. The con-
siderations underlying a presumption of validity at the efficiency end
are of greatly decreased relevance at what may be called the spec-
trum's substantive end. At this substantive end the presumption that
there must be forums for federal issues would weigh strongly against
restrictive jurisdictional statutes.
With this last presumption favoring federal forums as a guiding
principle, one may ascertain the scope of Congress' substantive juris-
dictional power by employing traditional statutory analysis. In pass-
ing on the validity of a federal statute one must determine its nat-
ural or probable effect and measure that effect against constitutional
requirements. If a statute fails to conform to those requirements it
must fall. The foregoing principles apply, of course, to jurisdictional
statutes, 124 but because jurisdictional statutes seem to have a less
direct substantive impact than other statutes, some preliminary anal-
ysis of the effects of jurisdictional statutes is in order.
The impact of a statute depriving both federal and state courts
of jurisdiction to hear a claim is obvious and drastic. Statutes that
foreclose only lower federal court jurisdiction have more subtle125
but no less serious substantive effects. Consider a statute that de-
prives lower federal courts, but not state courts, of jurisdiction to
hear a narrowly defined class of cases. Such a provision cannot be
justified, as some would claim,1 26 on the ground that inferior federal
jurisdiction is not really necessary to vindicate federal rights because
of the availability of Supreme Court review of state court decisions.
The volume of cases would render Supreme Court review an illu-
sion on all but a few substantive issues. It is unreasonable to expect
that the Court could vindicate federal rights for all litigants or even
classes of litigants who would seek review from it. 1 27
124. See pp. 523-27 infra.
125. In 1964, Congressman McCulloch argued that withdrawal of federal jurisdic-
tion in apportionment cases did not threaten to deprive individuals of constitutional
rights "because of the availability of State courts for redress .... ." 110 CONG. REC.
20250 (1964). The Nixon busing bills also leave unaffected state court jurisdiction.
Note, supra note 12, at 1553. For a response to Congressman McCulloch's argument,
see text accompanying notes 126-27 and pp. 522-23 infra.
126. See Hart, supra note 102, at 1401; cf. Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248
(1886); Hill, supra note 14, at 1117-18 (state courts are available to grant remedies for
constitutional rights in the absence of federal courts).
127. The Civil Rights Removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), is an indication that
in some cases Congress feels Supreme Court review is not adequate to secure federal
rights.
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Furthermore, in cases in which state courts uphold the validity
of federal statutes, appeal to the Supreme Court is not as of right.' 2
Even if the Court were physically capable of handling all of these
cases, there could be no guarantee to the parties that their federal
claims would ever be heard in a federal forum. Cases in which ap-
peal is supposedly as of right do not necessarily receive considera-
tion on the merits. The Court's practice of dismissing for want of
a substantial federal question 129 makes its control over its appellate
docket similar to its control over its certiorari docket.'3 0 Although
the two classes of cases may not receive identical treatment, 13 1 it is
certainly true that no particular litigant with a "right" of appeal
to the Court has any assurance that the Court will hear the merits
of his case.' 32 Thus exercise by Congress of broad jurisdictional
power based on the existence of state courts is not consistent with
the Article III role of the national judiciary.
It is not enough to say that state courts might perform well or
that the Supreme Court might grant certiorari or that the lower
federal courts might not be up to the task of protecting federal
rights. These results may all occur with some frequency. The crux
of the argument is independent of state court performance. The job
is given by Article III to the national judiciary. The framers un-
doubtedly realized that in some cases state courts could suffice, but
they chose to rely on independent and tenured federal judges for
the vindication of federal rights.
13 3
A second effect of a statute depriving lower federal courts of juris-
diction in federal cases is related to the fact that the Supreme Court
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). Appeal is of right only where a federal statute is held
unconstitutional by a state court.
129. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
130. See Frankfurter 8 Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1930); Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules,
68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 51 (1954) (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
131. See BATOR, supra note I1, at 649; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, TnE F.DERAL COURTS
& THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 574-75 (1953).
132. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 130, at 12-14. But see BATOR, supra
note 11, at 649.
133. In 1789 Oliver Ellsworth noted possible difficulties in relying on state courts
for the protection of federal claims. "To annex to State Courts jurisdictions which
they had not before, as of admiralty cases, and, perhaps, of offences against the United
States, would be constituting the judges of them, pro tanto, federal judges, and of
course they would continue such during good behavior, and on fixed salaries, which
in many cases would illy comport with their present tenure of office." Letter from
Ellsworth to Judge Richard Law, dated August 4, 1789, quoted in V. BROWN, TE
LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 189-90 (1905). Although Ellsworth mentions expressly only
admiralty and federal criminal cases, his point is also applicable to constitutional
claims not previously cognizable in state courts. Were Congress to attempt to abolish
federal jurisdiction in large classes of cases, or perhaps in any case of constitutional
dimension where no realistic federal review were available, careful scrutiny based on
Ellsworth's view would be necessary.
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cannot review each case. In the case of an individual whose federal
claim is rejected by state courts and who, because the Court is un-
able to hear all cases, fails to gain Supreme Court review, the ef-
fect of a federal jurisdictional withdrawal may be indistinguishable
from that of a substantive statute foreclosing his claim. Technical
niceties, of course, could be employed to distinguish the two kinds
of laws. Jurisdictional statutes are theoretically unrelated to primary
behavior; they impose no direct duties or penalties. The fact that a
law appears in the jurisdictional section of the United States Code,
however, does not mean that it lacks substantive impact. Thus, where
constitutional rights are rendered nugatory by state courts, 34 the
effect of a federal jurisdictional limitation on an individual denied
Supreme Court review is strikingly close to a substantive law limi-
tation.135 Indeed, this effect is the very reason for congressional at-
tempts to curtail jurisdiction. 130 Any substantive statute with such
deleterious effects on the enforcement of federal rights would be
struck down.137 Jurisdictional statutes should receive similar scrutiny.
They too are subject to constitutional limitations; 38 if they have
such unconstitutional substantive effects, they are themselves un-
constitutional.
The proposition that Congress may not accomplish by jurisdic-
tional manipulation that which it could not otherwise accomplish
was endorsed in two decisions rendered after Congress had foreclosed
state and federal jurisdiction to hear the particular claims involved.
In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,3 9 plaintiffs sued under the
134. Two examples are the wholly inadequate response of Mississippi courts to claims
by civil rights workers, documented in Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965), and state efforts to harass the
NAACP by use of official authority, including the courts. See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EiGHT
LONELY MEN 65-72 (1961). See also Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 510 (1963); Reitz, supra note 80, at
487.
135. Even in areas of high visibility, such as segregation, reliance on Supreme Court
review to protect federal rights is misplaced; cf. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955);
350 U.S. 985 (1956). The Supreme Court's departure from its initial function of vin-
dicating individual claims renders too uncertain the availability of review in any par-
ticular case. Even when the Court does act the delay endemic in appellate review
means that a victory will often come too late. See J. PELTASON, supra note 134, at
76-77; Amsterdam, supra note 134, at 798.
136. See note 120 supra.
137. Cf. Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (freedom of
choice plan); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (public support of
private segregation academies); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. La. 1961), affd mem., 368 U.S. 515 (1962); cases cited in Note, Segregation. Acade-
mies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1440 nn.34-35 (1973).
138. See pp. 525-26 infra.
139. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
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Fair Labor Standards Act,140 seeking compensation for time spent
cleaning up after their work days. The Act provides for compensation
at time and a half the normal wage for that part of a work week in
excess of 40 hours. The Supreme Court had previously held that the
term "work week" in the Act included the periods of time for which
plaintiffs sought compensation .141 Congress, fearing drastic unex-
pected liability for employers as a result of the Supreme Court de-
cisions, 1'2 enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,'43 which in ef-
fect overruled the Supreme Court's interpretation of "work week"
and deprived federal and state courts of jurisdiction to enforce the
unanticipated liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act.'4 4 Plain-
tiffs claimed that the Portal-to-Portal Act, which was made retroactive,
violated the Fifth Amendment's due process clause by destroying rights
recognized previously by the Supreme Court. The Battaglia court re-
jected the substantive claim on the merits 4 5 but did not feel that
the outcome was governed by the jurisdictional removal. If plain-
tiffs' substantive claim had been upheld, the jurisdictional limitation
would not have prevented the court from reaching the merits . 4
Congress could not accomplish by a jurisdictional limitation what it
could not accomplish by substantive regulation. 4 7 The substantive
impact of the jurisdictional statute in Battaglia was beyond question.
If, as argued above, statutes foreclosing only lower federal court ju-
risdiction have substantive impact, then the reasoning in Battaglia
applies to such laws.
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942s14 is the second in-
stance of a congressional attempt to withdraw certain claims from
federal and state courts. The Act deprived existing federal and state
courts 14 of jurisdiction to consider the validity of price regulations
promulgated under it and to restrain or enjoin enforcement of those
regulations. 50 The regulations could be attacked only in a new
140. Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1970)).
141. Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Jewell Ridge
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local,
321 U.S. 590 (1944).
142. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 322-23.
143. 29 U.S.C.§§ 251-62 (1970).
144. Id. at § 252(d).
145. See also Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1949).
146. 169 F.2d at 257.
147. Judge Chase wrote in his decision for the Second Circuit: "We think, how-
ever, that the exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction is subject to com-
pliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
148. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
149. Id. at § 204(d).
150. Id.
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Emergency Court of Appeals, created by the Act, the decisions of
which could be reviewed by the Supreme Court on petition for
writ of certiorari.' 0 '
Under provisions of the Act a district court convicted Yakus of
violating price regulations, rejecting his defense based on their al-
leged invalidity. In affirming the conviction, 5 2 the Supreme Court
held that there was no right to injunctive relief under the circum-
stances because the procedure for protest and review in the Emergency
Court of Appeals "affords to those affected a reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to present evidence."'153 The Court emphasized the
adequacy of the separate procedure' 54 and intimated that, in the ab-
sence of an adequate substitute, the statute under review might be
vulnerable.'
Additional support for subjecting jurisdictional statutes to con-
stitutional scrutiny comes from United States v. Klein.15 6 Klein was
administrator of the estate of a decedent whose cotton had been sold
by the Union during the Civil War. He sued the United States in
the Court of Claims under the Abandoned and Captured Property
Act' 57 for the value of the lost property. Federal legislation afforded
such a right of action to those who had never given any aid or com-
fort to the Confederacy.1ss In United States v. Padelford,5 9 the
Supreme Court had held that a presidential pardon, such as the
one obtained by Klein's decedent, was conclusive proof that the
claimant did not engage in the rebellion. Based on Padelford, the
Court of Claims granted Klein relief. While the government's appeal
from the decision was pending in the Supreme Court, Congress, re-
151. A party contesting a price regulation under the Act could file a protest with
the Price Administrator. Id. at § 203(a). If the protest was denied a complaint could
be filed with the Emergency Court of Appeals. Id. at § 204(a).
152. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
153. Id. at 433.
154. Id. at 444.
155. Id. at 446. In discussing the facts in Yakus the Court noted that penal con-
sequences could flow from departures from the rate schedule set by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and that the defendant in the criminal proceeding could not
raise the question of the reasonableness of the rates as a defense. Id. at 445-46. The
Court felt that such a limitation was unquestionably valid and went on to say: "As
we have pointed out such a requirement is objectionable only if by statutory command
or in operation it will deny, to those charged with violations, an adequate oppor-
tunity to be heard on the question of validity. And, as we have seen, petitioners fail
to show that such is the necessary effect of the present statute, or that if so applied
as to deprive them of an adequate opportunity to establish the invalidity of a regu-
lation there would not be adequate means of securing appropriate judicial relief in
the course either of the statutory proceeding or of the criminal trial." Id.
156. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
157. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
158. Id.
159. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
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acting to Padelford, enacted a statute declaring pardons inadmissible
and depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear a case in
which the claimant proved loyalty by use of a presidential pardon.1 60
The Court held the withdrawal of jurisdiction unconstitutional.
The rationale underlying Klein is not clear. The holding is fre-
quently interpreted to be that Congress cannot "prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department" in pending cases. 10' Such a
view cannot easily be reconciled with the well-established principle
that appellate courts are obliged to follow changes in the law en-
acted during the pendency of an appeal, 162 a principle which would
seem to apply with full force to an otherwise valid jurisdictional
limitation.'13 There is also language in the opinion suggesting that
a crucial aspect of the case was the fact that the United States was
a party and that it is particularly offensive for a litigant to prescribe
a rule of decision for its own case.'04 Yet in many instances the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity allows the United States to decide
whether it will be subject to suit at all. Klein's was just such a case
because he based his cause of action on an act of Congress. More
to the point, on at least one occasion the Court has upheld Con-
gress' repeal of a statute authorizing an action against the United
States after the case had been decided by the Court of Claims and
while an appeal to the Supreme Court was pending.03 Perhaps the
safest reading of Klein is that it precludes Congress from impairing
160. The statute was enacted as a rider on an appropriation bill. Act of July 12,
1870, 16 Stat. 235.
161. Note, supra note 12, at 1556-57, quoting 80 U.S. at 146. See Ratner, supra note
15, at 181 ("[T]he constitutional principle . . . asserted [in Klein] would preclude any
congressional attempt to control the decision in a particular case through the guise
of a jurisdictional limitation .... "); Note, Moratorium on School Busing for the
Purpose of Achieving Racial Balance: A New Chapter in Congressional Court-Curbing,
48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 208, 229 (Klein precludes congressional control of a particu-
lar case). Note in this regard that the compromise jurisdictional provision in the re-
cently enacted Alaska Pipeline Bill specifically exempts from the jurisdictional with-
drawal all constitutional questions. Section 203(d) of Title II says in pertinent part:
The actions taken pursuant to this title . . . shall be taken without further action
under [NEPA] . . . and the actions of Federal officers [in furtherance of this Act]
shall not be subject to judicial review under any law except that claims al-
leging the invalidity of this section may be brought within sixty days following
its enactment, and claims alleging that an action will deny rights under the
Constitution of the United States . . . may be brought within sixty days following
the date of such action.
Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 203(d) (Nov. 16, 1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 21 (Statutes: Dec.
4, 1973). See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
162. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901); BATOR, supra note 11, at
316 n.4 & cases cited therein.
163. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901), in which the Court dis-
missed, for want of jurisdiction, an appeal from a Court of Claims decision where,
during the pendency of the appeal, Congress repealed the act under which the action
had been brought.
164. 80 U.S. at 146 ("Can we [dismiss the appeal] without allowing one party to
the controversy to decide in its own favor?"). See Ratner, supra note 15, at 181.
165. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
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the Executive's power to pardon.16  In any event, the Court did find
a jurisdictional statute unconstitutional and that alone demonstrates
that such laws are subject to constitutional limitation. °7
Thus, it is clear that jurisdictional statutes are subject to constitu-
tional limitations. This, in turn, provides a basis for measuring such
statutes in terms of their substantive impact-the procedure followed
in Yakius and Battaglia. When their effect is to abrogate constitutional
rights, they are no more valid than any other statute violating the
Constitution.
The corollary of the foregoing is that Congress has unfettered
power to enact jurisdictional laws that accomplish what it could
have accomplished by means of a substantive rule; that is, it may
enact any jurisdictional statute that does not prevent vindication of
a constitutional right. In cases in which Congress can constitutionally
prescribe a rule of decision, no federal right that could be vindicated
under a constitutional claim can be excluded from the federal courts
by the withdrawal of jurisdiction. 108 In short, Congress can withdraw
166. 80 U.S. at 147. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 315; Note, supra note 12, at 1557;
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. This is the only specific ground of decision mentioned by Pro-
fessor Fairman. C. FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUIREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 845 (1971).
Bator et al. note another flaw found by the Court. "[I]n forbidding the court 'to
give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have'
and directing the court 'to give it an effect precisely contrary,' 'Congress has inad-
vertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power
... " BATOR 315 (quoting Klein). The second part of the quotation is of course
merely a conclusion and offers no support for the holding. The first part is open to
the objection made in the text, see p. 526 supra, that Congress may change the
law pending appeal.
167. Note, supra note 12, at 1557, states that Klein merely "suggests" such a con-
clusion. An actual holding of unconstitutionality appears to be more than a suggestion.
In light of the ambiguities surrounding the Court's opinion already noted in the text,
however, a cautious reading of the case is appropriate. But cf. Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (Congress' jurisdictional power is "subject to other constitu-
tional limitations.').
168. Congress' power to waive jurisdiction of parties who have obtained it col-
lusively is another instance where no constitutional right is sacrificed by a jurisdic-
tional limitation. No federal interest is lost when jurisdiction is not extended to
parties who have, in their exuberance to obtain a federal forum, exceeded the spirit
of the Constitution's jurisdictional grant.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), one of the early cases to allow a re-
striction of federal jurisdiction, upheld a statute that deprived the old circuit courts
of jurisdiction to hear "any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or
other chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prose-
cuted in such court to recover the contents, if no assignment had been made, except
in cases of foreign bills of exchange." 49 U.S. at 441. The statute was designed to
prevent collusive federal suits. BATOR, supra note 11, at 34. Perhaps it should have
been construed to apply only where collusion was found (It was not. H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, supra note 131, at 39, 918), but it has since been redrafted to apply only
in proven cases of collusion. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970).
Although on its facts a state court judgment in Sheldon would not have been re-
viewable in the Supreme Court, BATOR 315, had any constitutional rights been at
stake, the Judiciary Act would have permitted review. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25,
1 Stat. 73, 85. At the time of Sheldon Supreme Court review was probably still adequate
as the sole mechanism for vindication of federal rights. The caseload of the Court
in 1850 was about 250 cases. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 60, at 60. The
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jurisdiction from all cases except those in which a particular out-
come is mandated by the Constitution.'0 9
The above explains why the Norris-LaGuardia Act 170 is valid. That
Act severely restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue
injunctions or temporary restraining orders in labor disputes. It
therefore limits the remedies available to an aggrieved party.171 All
other state and federal remedies, however, remain available. As long
as an injunction is not constitutionally required, 72 Congress may
deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to issue it. In those labor
cases where the Constitution may compel injunctive relief, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act probably permits it.173 The Norris-LaGuardia Act can
thus be sustained because what Congress accomplished with a jurisdic-
tional statute could permissibly have been accomplished with a sub-
stantive rule. That is, Congress could have declared that the circum-
stances enumerated in the injunction clause must be found to prevail
before a party would have a right to an injunction in a labor dis-
pute. Such a law would have had the same effect as the rule denying
federal courts jurisdiction to do otherwise. Such a jurisdictional re-
striction does not deprive anyone of a federal "right" because Con-
gress could have restricted the remedy by substantive regulation.
Congress phrased the Norris-LaGuardia Act in jurisdictional terms
Court's docket seems to have outgrown the capacities of nine men around 1870. Id.
At the time of Sheldon, therefore, lower courts with broad jurisdiction may not have
been necessary to ensure vindication of all federal rights.
My thesis does suggest that from the time the Supreme Court's docket became un-
manageable until the time federal question jurisdiction was granted to the lower
federal courts, the system was unconstitutional. This was, however, a brief period, if
it existed at all. For at about the time the Court's docket became too large for it
to handle, Congress gave the lower courts a broad federal question jurisdictional
grant. Act of May 31, 1870, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 142; Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 420.
The federalists had been only temporarily successful in conferring broad federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89. That provision was repealed when
Jefferson came to power. Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.
169. Professor Hart suggested using this principle when plaintiffs complain of
extra-judicial governmental coercion-action by government officials against private
persons or private property. Of jurisdictional restrictions in connection with such
programs, he states: "[T]he validity of the jurisdictional limitation depends on the
validity of the program itself .... ." Hart, supra note 102, at 1387. Hart's limitation
to coercive government programs is unduly restrictive, for the principle logically applies
in other circumstances. If, for example, in the Portal-to-Portal cases, which involved
noncoercive legislation, the due process clause had been held violated, it would make
no difference in analyzing the jurisdictional statute that the legislation was noncoercive.
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
171. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 220 (1928); Note,
supra note 12, at 1549.
172. For a discussion of constitutionally mandated remedies see pp. 530-32 infra.
173. Section 7 of the Act allows a court after factfinding to issue injunctions if (1)
unlawful acts have been threatened, will be or have been committed and will con-
tinue; (2) substantial and irreparable injury will result; (3) greater injury will result to
complainant by denial of relief than to defendants by granting; (4) there is no adequate
remedy at law; and (5) the public officers charged with protecting complainants are
unwilling or unable to do so. 29 U.S.C. §107 (1970). It is my view that this provision
probably covers all cases in which an injunction may be constitutionally compelled.
For instances where injunctions have been allowed, see BATOR, supra note 11, at 317 n.5.
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to avoid an apparent conflict with earlier Supreme Court cases. In
Truax v. Corrigan74 the Supreme Court struck down, as a denial
of due process, a state statute limiting employers' remedies in a fashion
similar to the limitation in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Because it
is highly unlikely that Truax would be decided the same way to-
day, 175 there is little current constitutional difficulty with the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Its restriction on jurisdiction does not deny anyone
an otherwise obtainable constitutional right.
The decision that upheld the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Lauf v. E.G.
Shinner & Co.,'70 contains some broad dicta' 7" with respect to the
authority of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Although Lauf is not a great problem today because the substantive
rules of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are clearly constitutional, it can
be explained. Laufs holding, as opposed to its broad dicta, would
present no problem if, at the time it was decided, Truax was already
discredited, for then the Norris-LaGuardia Act would merely have
the effect of accomplishing through jurisdiction what Congress could
do through substantive rulemaking. By the time Lauf was decided,
Truax was already in peril; substantive due process, the approach
employed in Truax, saw its demise the year before.17 Therefore, al-
though the Lauf court did not have to reach the substantive issue of
the validity of the district court injunction because it upheld the
withdrawal of jurisdiction, the Court would have upheld as well a
substantive rule having the same effect as withdrawal of jurisdiction.
Congress' ability to limit federal court jurisdiction is in part an
outgrowth of its general lawmaking power as set forth in Article I
of the Constitution. This power, under steady expansion since Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,70 enables Congress to create, refine, and re-
peal an enormous array of federal rights. Congress' authority to cur-
174. 257 U.S. 312 (1924).
175. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
176. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
177. The precise words of the Court were: "There can be no question of the power
of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United
States." Id. at 330. The majority opinion failed to mention Truax, and thus to over-
rule it, but that the case was in the Court's mind is shown by the dissenting opinion
of Justice Butler. Id. at 332.
178. See E. BARRET, P. BRUTON & J. HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 670 (1968);
R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 23 (1972). The Court's inability to tic
privacy-related decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), to the constitutional text again raises the
spectre of substantive due process as epitomized by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). One commentator makes a plausible case for viewing the Court's most re-
cent foray into privacy, the abortion case, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as less
justifiable than the thoroughly discredited Lochner decision. Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973). See also
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Dobuble Standards; Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 272-311 (1973).
179. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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tail these nonconstitutional rights extends to the courthouse steps.
Congress' authority to curtail constitutional rights does not. Congress'
broad power over the availability of judicial relief for nonconstitu-
tional claims gives it room to promote efficiency without endanger-
ing federal court availability for constitutional rights.'8 0 In addition
to authorizing total exclusion of many cases, it permits Congress to
relegate many nonconstitutional claims to administrative courts in
lieu of full-fledged Article III tribunals.'8 '
The result of the foregoing is to strike a middle ground between
the extremes of a complete absence of lower federal court jurisdiction
and complete vesting of the federal constitutional jurisdictional grant.
The extremes can be rejected on practical8 2 as well as constitutional
grounds. Important and difficult questions arise in attempting to
stake out a rational middle ground that is consistent with modern
conditions and with the Article III grant of jurisdiction. In seeking
a solution difficult lines have to be drawn. The true substantive
impact of a jurisdictional statute may not always be apparent. The
line between efficiency motivated and substantive jurisdictional stat-
utes may not always be clear. Difficult distinctions are of course not
peculiar to the problem at hand. Some consolation may also be had
from the severe difficulties that would necessarily follow from em-
bracing an opposite view. If Congress may single out a class of cases
for exclusion from lower federal courts because of disagreement with
judicial results, there is no principled way to brake this power short
of permitting removal of all constitutional issues from those courts.
III. Remedies and Busing
Yakus and other cases indicate that Congress must provide reme-
dies for protecting rights.8 3 The power to regulate remedies, like
the power to regulate jurisdiction, is sometimes translatable into a
power to regulate substantive rights. 8 4 Statutes that control juris-
diction to issue remedies can thus affect substantive rights. They
are, therefore, subject to the same restrictions as jurisdictional statutes,
which leads to the following conclusions analogous to those reached
with respect to jurisdictional statutes: (1) Congress cannot withdraw
180. For example, any diversity case in which a constitutional right is not at stake
could be excluded. Diversity jurisdiction is often criticized for misallocating federal
judicial resources. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 139-52.
181. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932).
182. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 6-14.
183. See pp. 531-32 infra.
184. See Hill, supra note 14. As the discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act showed,
the line between "jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction to issue remedies" is unclear.
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jurisdiction to issue any constitutionally required remedy;18a and (2)
Congress can withdraw jurisdiction to issue any remedy not so re-
quired.
The school busing issue can be used to illustrate the permissible
breadth of congressional jurisdictional control over district court
remedies. If busing is a constitutionally required remedy in a par-
ticular case,"' then removal of jurisdiction to issue a busing order
is clearly unconstitutional. Were it not, Congress, under the pretense
of regulating remedies, could achieve substantive results otherwise
beyond its power. That state courts can hear busing requests subject
to Supreme Court review is no substitute; Supreme Court review is
too infrequent to guarantee vindication of federal rights.
If a particular remedy is not constitutionally required, different
considerations control. Providing particular remedies when no single
remedy is constitutionally necessary is not essential for the proper
conduct of the business of the federal judiciary. As long as the federal
rights involved in a case can be adequately vindicated in some man-
ner, Congress may adjust the available remedies with impunity. 8 7
The cases support Congress' power to choose among remedies. In
the area of taxation, the Court had upheld provisions requiring pro-
testing taxpayers to pay taxes first and litigate later, 88 forbidding
injunctions against collection of taxes,'8 9 and requiring taxpayers to
contest assessments before, rather than after, payment. 90 Similarly, in
Yakus the Court rejected petitioner's claim that statutory preclusion
of injunctive relief was unconstitutional,' 91 and in 1868, the Court
185. That there may be constitutionally required remedies is suggested by Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Hill, supra note 14, at 1149.
186. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Part III of
the Swann decision confronts the question of remedies and implies that in certain cir-
cumstances a remedy or remedies might be constitutionally required. "Once a right
and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies ..... As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy." Id. at 15-16. The school authorities argued that "the equity
powers of federal district courts have been limited by Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964" which reads in pertinent part:
Nothing herein shall empower an official or court of the United States to issue any
order seeking to achieve racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation
of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another
in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of
the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards.
Id. at 16-17. The Court interpreted this section to mean not that Congress was at-
tempting to curtail existing equitable remedies, but that it wanted the courts to under-
stand that it was not creating new remedies to attack de facto segregation. Id.
187. See Hart, supra note 102, at 1S66-67.
188. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586 (1880).
189. See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883).
190. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
191. 321 U.S. at 439-43.
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upheld withdrawal of its habeas corpus appellate jurisdiction where
a direct petition to it would lie and where lower federal courts still
had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions. 19
2
Conclusion
The inability of the Supreme Court to do justice in every case
within the Article III grant of jurisdiction has broad implications.
It means that Congress cannot deny lower federal courts jurisdiction
on the ground that Supreme Court review of state court decisions
provides an adequate mechanism for vindicating federal rights. It
also means that jurisdictional statutes which foreclose only lower
federal court jurisdiction and which have substantive impact must
be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. 93 The conclusion is also in-
escapable that Congress cannot withdraw federal jurisdiction to hear
cases in which constitutional rights are at stake;' 94 nor can Congress
192. Compare Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), with Ex parte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). See Note, supra note 12, at 1555-56. McCardle, which up-
held Congress' power to withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas
corpus cases, lends some support to those who feel Congress has substantial control
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under the "exceptions" clause. The
case does not undercut the thesis advanced here because the jurisdictional withdrawal
did not affect the power of lower federal courts to hear habeas corpus cases. See Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 n.15 (1963).
Yerger can perhaps be seen as lending substantial weight to the thesis advanced
here. In Yerger the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Chase, relied on a
portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 not repealed by the statute withdrawing the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases (upheld in McCardle)
to assert jurisdiction to issue its own writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court for
Mississippi had refused to issue the writ. If Chief Justice Chase's opinion is to be
reconciled with his opinion in McCardle, where he also wrote for the majority, it
must be read very narrowly. While it is true that McCardle was decided on the basis
of the exceptions clause, it is also true that in Yerger the Court was in fact serving
as an appellate court for the order denying the writ. At one point, Chief Justice Chase
wrote, "They [the words of the act] affected only appeals and appellate jurisdiction
authorized by that act. They do not purport to touch the appellate jurisdiction con-
ferred by the Constitution, or to except from it any cases not excepted by the act of
1789." Id. at 105.
The essence of any narrow reading of Yerger must be that the Constitution ex-
plicitly grants the courts the right to issue a writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1,
§ 9, cl. 2. Even read in this light, the Yerger case puts a gloss on Article III, § 2, cl. 2,
that generally supports the thesis advanced here.
193. Contrast with the conclusion reached here the statement:
Habeas corpus aside, I'd hesitate to say that Congress couldn't effect an uncon-
stitutional withdrawal of jurisdiction-that is, a withdrawal to effectuate uncon-
stitutional purposes-if it really wanted to.
Hart, supra note 102, at 1398-99. One interesting side-effect of this statement, if ac-
cepted, would be that, in effect, the Congress without the concurrence of the states could
repeal the Tenth Amendment by a jurisdictional statute.
194. The conclusion that federal courts must be available to vindicate constitutional
rights has important implications for federal habeas law. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the two landmarks in the modern ex-
pansion of federal habeas corpus, the Court proceeded by construing the federal habeas
statutes and by ascertaining the historical scope of the Great Writ. Some have ar-
gued that it misconstrued those statutes, see BATOR, supra note 11, at 1467 n.3; Mayers,
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cu1.
L. REv. 31 (1965), and that it misread the Writ's history. See Oaks, Legal History in
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withdraw jurisdiction to grant constitutionally required remedies.
Lest anyone misinterpret the argument advanced here, let me add
one caveat that has been noted earlier. It is clear from the text of
the Constitution and the Convention's deliberations that no single
form of lower court system is mandated. 19; It may well suffice to
provide an appeal to a subordinate federal court from state courts,10 6
as long as such forums are generally available.
The lower federal courts are thus indispensable if the judiciary is
to be a co-equal branch and if the "judicial Power of the United
States"' 97 is to remain the power to protect rights guaranteed by
the Constitution and its Amendments. Abolition of the lower federal
courts is no longer constitutionally permissible; with the demise of
the assumption that they may be abolished it must necessarily follow
that the jurisdiction of these courts is not a matter solely within the
discretion of Congress.'98
the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 451 (1966); Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1045-50 (1970).
Fay and Brown can be placed on alternative and more permanent footing by re-
garding federal habeas corpus for state prisoners not as a matter of statutory or his-
torical interpretation, but merely as one necessary technique for implementing the na-
tional judiciary's role as vindicator of individual rights in each case within its juris-
diction. This is not to say that federal habeas is the only possible means of satisfying
this role. Absent alternatives, widespread federal habeas for state prisoners may well
be constitutionally mandated. Each state applicant need not be afforded a full-blown
federal hearing. Reliance on the record of the state proceedings is not only appro-
priate, but probably necessary to avoid undue burdens on the lower courts. See LaVallee
v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
195. The inadvisability of fixing in the Constitution the precise structure of the
federal system's lower echelons was noted long ago. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 517
(Pendleton at Virginia deliberations).
196. "I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from
the State courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending
the power of doing it may be imagined." THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 495 (New Am.
Lib. ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). One recent proposal designed, in part, to relieve the
caseload burden created by state prisoners who seek federal habeas corpus, recom-
mends creation of a federal appellate court with direct review over state criminal
proceedings. Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve The Administration of Justice,
59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142, 166-67 (1970).
197. U.S. CoNsT-. art. III, § 1.
198. Two arguments which seemingly stress "political" considerations and which have
not hitherto received attention in this article support giving Congress broad power to
withdraw cases from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The first of these suggests
that the "legitimacy" of judicial review is "enormously buttressed" by allowing Con-
gress broad, and substantive, jurisdictional power. BATOR, supra note 11, at 364. The
second argument is that Congress, which now needs the courts to enforce and interpret
its statutes, would not in fact severely limit lower federal court jurisdiction. Wechsler,
The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1965).
With respect to the first argument, it seems to me that endangering the liberties
of all of us is an excessively high price to pay for some unknown amount of legiti-
mation of judicial review, a phenomenon not seriously under attack in this country.
It would be small consolation to a black forced to use segregated public facilities be-
cause of a withdrawal of federal jurisdiction to know that his loss has in some mystical
way strengthened the judiciary's authority to hold federal laws unconstitutional.
As for the second argument, it is comforting to think that, because of the exigencies
of the day, it is unlikely that jurisdictional cutbacks will occur. The threat, however,
is more real than Professor Wechsler leads us to believe, especially as the recent con-
troversy about limiting federal court authority to issue busing orders amply illustrates.
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